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Abstract
The rapid turnover and acceptance of technology advancements have driven down their
cost to consumers. This has led to improvements in content delivery mechanisms, which
in turn, allows media distributors to place a premium on the consumer’s freedom to choose
the means of media delivery. However, traditional media distributors such as the music,
movie, and television industries have rejected new business models based on these
technology advancements.

Additionally, the Dot-Com Era instilled society with a

burdensome set of social norms such that computer piracy is becoming accepted as a
victimless crime; a view staunchly rejected by artists and copyright holders. In an attempt
to preserve their cartel structure, media companies have adopted a strategy of legal and
governmental action that has driven consumers from the marketplace. Finally, the media
industry’s oligopoly cannot exist and grow in a free market economy such as the U.S.
Therefore, traditional media must consider the shifting trends and market threats in order to
protect their creative content and realign social norms achievable by utilizing better
management of the content supply chain.
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Introduction
Not even the Fountain of Youth will let an industry cheat death. As demanding
people, society constantly seeks efficiency, advancement, and change in industry in order
to persist. Technological advancement represents a prime example of this evolutionary
trend.

While technology based products were initially considered large capital

investments, upgrades and obsolescence now encompass life cycles so short they are
simply rolled into the cost of doing business1. On the consumer end of the spectrum, the
rapid turnover in technology has driven down costs and made cutting-edge access to the
digital world accessible to the masses2. Technology advancements have not only led to
wide scale accessibility, but also improvements in content delivery mechanisms. As the
content delivery systems have improved in efficiency and become more accessible to a
wider range of audiences the ability to provide on-demand media has permitted distributors
to place a premium on the freedom of choice. However, the premium cost has not been
adopted in all cases, especially in traditional music, movie, and television distribution, but
these industries have not curbed the demand for such advancements.
Society has developed a burdensome set of social norms. With the advent of largescale file sharing and publicity surrounding peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, society shifted to
the mentality that computer piracy was perfectly acceptable because it was a victimless
crime. However, copyright holders contest they were as much a victim as in any robbery.
The copyright holder’s needs began to be addressed by media studios and representative
1

Within slow computing organizations such as government agencies, the expected life cycle of desktops is 45 years and laptops 2-3 years with a 20% failure rate.
PC Life Cycles: Guidelines for Establishing Life Cycles for Personal Computers, Texas Department of
Information Resources, 5-6 (Jan. 2003) <http://www.dir.state.tx.us/eod/pc/pc-cycle.pdf>.
2

As of March 18, 2004, 74.9% of consumers above the age of two had access to the Internet.
Web Access at 75 Percent, Wired News (March 18, 2004)
<http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,62712,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_5>.
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groups such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) largely through a series of threats, lobbyist
actions, and lawsuits. In lieu of all the money being filtered through the legal and political
system, the social norms were not shifted into a model that could meet both the consumer
and copyright holder’s needs. This has long been an issue vocalized by consumers, but
rarely addressed by media groups. At the root of all this is the media industries inability to
recognize their imminent death as a result of failure to adequately maximize their
competitive advantages in representing their constituents.
When dealing with large, intertwined industries like movie and music companies,
the onus must be placed on the distributors and representative groups to harness changes in
technology; not only to protect, but to disseminate artists’ works. The media companies
have adopted a strategy of legal and governmental action which has driven consumers
from the marketplace in an attempt to brainwash consumer thought. The copyright holders
and their representative groups must consider both the present results and side effects of
their current tactics in calculating a future strategy. It is essential they protect their creative
content and realign social norms by utilizing market trends and technological advances to
better manage the content supply chain and preserve industry growth.

I.

Technological and Digital Distribution Evolutions
Over the course of time technology advancements and relaxed federal regulation

have had grandiose effects on the media and content delivery industries.

The cable

industry, for example, has propelled growth through market forces. Beginning in the
1980s, the cable industry experienced rapid growth resulting from market deregulation and

2

the introduction of new technology, namely satellite-delivered cable systems3. As a result,
cable has emerged as a fifty-one billion dollar a year industry with nearly seventy-four
million users in the United States4 and has experienced an 80% growth rate between 1992
and 20035. The movie industry is another industry that has benefited from similar factors.
The movie industry, while lagging as of late, has experienced remarkable growth
with the introduction of new technology. The movie industry has a viewer base where,
“Over 70% of the population rents or goes to movies regularly, thus accounting for over
1.5 billion movie attendances each year in the U.S.,” as of 20016. Home movie sales on
VHS and DVD have also significantly increased revenue for the movie studios. In 2004,
home video purchases were up an additional 15% from 2003 and estimated to close out the
year at approximately $16.5 billion in sales7. DVD sales alone have experienced a growth
thirty times over between 1998 and 20038. Some argue access to these revenue streams
would not be permitted at all had the prediction of Jack Valenti, then president of the
MPAA, before the U.S. Senate in 1984 had come true. Mr. Valenti, in referring to the
advent of Sony Corporation’s Betamax machine such that, “the VCR is to the American
film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home

3

Roni Mueller & Gretchen Wattig, The "New" Series Co-Production Deal in Network Series Television, 31
Sw. U. L. Rev. 627, 655 (2002).

4

Industry Overview: Statistics & Resources, National Cable and Telecommunications Association (May
2004) <http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=86>.

5

Jim Trautman, Cable's Economic Influence Grows, National Cable and Telecommunications Association
(August 11, 2003) <http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=325>.
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James Jaeger, The Movie Industry, Matrixx Entertainment Corporations (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://www.mecfilms.com/moviepubs/memos/moviein.htm>.
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Thomas K. Arnold, DVD Update, The Hollywood Reporter (Oct. 14, 2004)
<http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/television/feature_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000672279>.

8

See Appendix A.
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alone.9” This prophecy was not accepted by the Supreme Court10 and now advances in
technology are feeding the media industries. Yet, as if history needed to be re-mastered,
the story is being re-released.

II.

Content Distribution and Piracy Battle Plans
While evolutions and advancements in technology have brought forth growth for

the media industries, one major wide-scale advancement has also lead to an
insurmountable task for content distributors. That advancement is the accessibility to the
Internet and cyberspace.
The Internet, or more generally, computers sharing processes via communication
channels have been in existence for many years. Between 1977 and 1978, the first Bulletin
Board Service (BBS) was introduced, which allowed anyone with a computer and a
modem to connect to another computer and download files11. It may be argued that since
that time, the scope of the architecture has not changed, but rather the scale of the
distribution system.

While users no longer depend on direct connections from one

computer to the other, users still generally use their computers to explore countless files
and information existing in a world built not on brick and mortar, but rather electron
transfer. One-to-one BBS connections have been replaced by a global network of servers,
routers, hubs, and PCs. Most importantly, the ease of use and related, complex marketing
trends have brought what was once a mostly underground system into the mainstream.
9

20th Anniversary of Betamax: the Court Case that Brought You the VCR, Public Knowledge (visited Nov.
3, 2004) <http://www.publicknowledge.org/content/cases/betamax%20case/>.

10

See generally, Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

11

See generally, Henry Edward Hardy, The History of the Net (Sept. 28, 1993) (unpublished Master's thesis,
Grand Valley State University) (available at <http://china.si.umich.edu/econ495/docs/hardy_net.history.txt>).
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Unfortunately the problems that existed in the digital underground still exists in the
mainstream Internet; users are trading copyrighted material with complete disregard for the
copyright holder’s rights. This issue is one the movie and music industries did not face
during the BBS era; however the software industry has been through it before.
The software industry has had to deal with piracy via underground trading for
years. In 1996, the software industry estimated a $2.3 billion loss in the U.S. and $11.3
billion loss globally as a result of piracy12. As of 2002 the numbers decreased to an
estimated $2 billion in lost revenue in the U.S., but $13 billion globally13. These numbers
represent a piracy rate over three times larger than that estimated by the music or movie
industry14. In lieu of this, the software industry has not made the mistake of leading a
campaign to annihilate all potential home pirates as in the music and movie industry. The
reason the software industry has more experienced in dealing with piracy is because of
their product’s format; software has always been digital, making it very easy to copy15.
Similar to what the media industries are now experiencing, software can be easily
reproduced and the second copy is exactly the same as the original. Further, in the
software industry, as new technology, copying methods, and communication methods have
emerged, they have not fought to subdue these upgrades, but rather use them to operate
more efficiently and to decrease their overall operating costs.

12

Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 235, 240 n.12 (1999).

13

Software Piracy Fact Sheet, Business Software Alliance, pg. 1 (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://www.bsa.org/resources/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=1292&hitboxdone
=yes>.

14

Anti-Piracy, Recording Industry Association of America (visited Nov. 4, 2004)
<http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp>.
15

Tanya Poth, The Computer Piracy Superhighway, 28 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 469, 472 (2000).
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To balance consumer demand and copyright protection, the software industry has
taken a multi-tiered approach to curbing piracy16. First, they have created international
organizations to raise awareness as to relevant intellectual property issues17. Second, they
have used existing technology to increase security features associated with the use and
distribution of software18. Third, the software industry has created trade groups focused on
education, amnesty, and litigation of piracy related issues19. This multi-tiered approach in
conjunction with revised business models has had a distinct impact on lowering software
piracy rates20. The Business Software Alliance (BSA) is the primary trade group for the
software industry in relation to software piracy. The:
BSA stated that piracy rates have been falling modestly since 1994. The
organization discusses several reasons for the decline, including lowering
the price of commercial software to make it more affordable. Also,
governments are taking a more active role in protecting intellectual property
rights within their own borders and in relation to international trade21
This approach may sound similar to the method pursued by the movie and music industry.
So why has the result been different? Why have piracy rates been growing in the visual
and audio media markets while falling in the software realm? There are a number of
distinguishing factors which must be addressed in order to understand the dichotomy.

16

Id. at 483.

17

Id. at 484-485.

18

Id. at 486-487.

19

Id. at 487-490.

20

Id. at 491.

21

Id.
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III.

Industry Power Structures Drive Regulation and Norms
There are a number of factors that distinguish the software industry and their effort

to stop piracy from that of the music and movie industry. Many of the major issues are
rooted in current social norms and the manner of strategy execution, but the most
important factors relate to the manner in which the industries operate.

A.

Identifying Industry Power Structures

One major distinguishing factor between the battle over copyrights in the software
and media industries is the number of competitors within the market place. The software
industry is able to adjust its operating model based on a competitive, free market economy
approach defined by:
dynamic, vigorous competition… [where] the early entrants into a new
software category quickly captures a lion's share of the sales, while other
products in the category are either driven out altogether or relegated to
niche positions. What eventually displaces the leader is often not
competition from another product within the same software category, but
rather a technological advance that renders the boundaries defining the
category obsolete.22
While it may be contended that this view is a static market analysis, in the software
industry, the overall barriers to entry are low based on substitute products, seller power,
buyer power, and the sheer number of new entrants23. Considering the media industries’
model, the free market economy approach does not provide scale as in the software
industry.
22

Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of Ideas: The Logic of Technology Markets, 14 Harv. J.
Law & Tec 83, 132 (2000), citing United States v. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1999).

23

Juho Lindman, Effects of Open Source Software on the Business Patterns of Software Industry 25 (Fall
2004) (unpublished master's thesis, Helsinki School of Economics Department of Management) (available at
<http://www.greywolves.org/~deltax/gradu.rtf>).
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One popular mentality advocated is that the music and movie industries operate
under a monopolistic model and use this power to exert strength over governmental and
social choice24. In his book Free Culture Lawrence Lessig presents this idea on numerous
occasions25. Mr. Lessig states powerful arguments in regard to this approach, however,
there is one major flaw in this presentation; the media industries do not fit into a standard
monopolistic model. Traditional media operates as an oligopoly. This distinction is not
simply rhetoric and must be examined carefully in order to better understand the operating
regime.
Since the software industry is operating based on a free market economy model,
prices are set by auction26.

In this model, market place pricing is set by what the

consumers are willing to pay compared to the relative competition27. As new entrants
move into the market, prices are distinguished by supply and demand as well as
competitive behavior and competitive positioning or product differentiation28.

In the

software industry, through the use of technology and the market progress, the experience
curve has shifted and firms have become both more effective and efficient. However,
monopolies and oligopolies are infused with inherently different operations.

24

LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 88-94 (Penguin Books 2004).

25

Id.

26

Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business
Administration, in Detroit, MI (May 24, 2004).

27

MICHAEL HITT ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 57 (6th ed., Thompson Pub. 2004).

28

Id. at 56-59.
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In a monopoly in the U.S., there are not one, but rather two primary players; the
firm in question and the government29.

In a monopoly there may be relatively inelastic

demand curves meaning that consumer demand does not fluctuate significantly based on
product price30. However in a true monopolistic market in the U.S., the government has
the right to regulate change or decline a change in pricing31. On the other hand, an
oligopoly consists of relatively few competitors where pricing and strategic decisions by
one firm directly affect the output of other firms32. When analyzing markets operating as
an oligopoly, it is apparent there are profit incentives for the firms to cooperate in the
decision-making process, which in turn could lead to collusion33.

So why is this

distinction important in the media industries? Namely because of the power an oligopoly
industry possesses over a monopolistic industry.
A monopoly that seeks to exclude firms from the market or impair their ability to
compete cannot exist unless it is regulated by the government34. Therefore, regulated
monopolies, such as utilities, have their prices set by the government35. An oligopoly also
exhibits what is commonly known as monopolistic tendencies, however, since there are

29

Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business
Administration, in Detroit, MI (May 31, 2004).

30

WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MICROECONOMICS 200 (5th ed., Thompson Pub. 2000).

31

Id. at 197-198.

32

Ted Bergstrom, Oligopoly, University of California, Santa Barabara Department of Economics, slide 2
(visited Nov. 1, 2004) <http://econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/Ec100AF01/PPSlides/Ch27.ppt>.

33

Id. at slide 45.

34

Federal Trade Commission: Maintaining or Creating a Monopoly, Free Advice (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://law.freeadvice.com/resources/gov_material/ftc_guide_to_antitrust_laws_monopoly.htm>.
35

Chapter 11, Oswego State University of New York, Department of Economics (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://www.oswego.edu/~economic/eco101/chap11/chap11.htm>.
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more firms involved with the competition, there is more freedom to act36. There are an
identifiable number of firms involved in the media industries and as a corollary, there is
similar pricing; the price for a CD distributed by Sony tends to be similar to a CD released
by Warner Music. Particularly, in the music industry, five firms control 80% of all titles
produced in the U.S.37 Based on this, there is a risk for both predatory pricing and
collusion. While it may be difficult to identify collusion, the lobbying effort by the record
industries for stiffer copyright protection seems to be a perfect example38. This arguably
collusive behavior is reflected in the treatment of the artists as well.

B.

Fitting an Elephant through the Eye of a Needle

The balance between copyright holders and the media companies that distribute the
works presents an undeniable dichotomy between creator’s rights and big business. The
Congressional Budget Office produced a report that appropriately cites the distinction as,
“the ability of copyright holders and the industries that market and distribute creative
products to find ways of applying those new technologies to generate sufficient returns to
maintain the flow of new creative works.39” However, the lobbying efforts by the media
industry attempt to shift the view such that they are not media distributors or copyright
holder representatives, but rather creators themselves. This is an important distinction
because it clarifies the motivation of the media groups’ efforts to lobby, litigate, and

36

MCEACHERN, supra note 30, at 230-234.

37

Industry Brief: Music Recording 1, Oligopoly Watch (June 28, 2003)
<http://www.oligopolywatch.com/2003/06/28.html>.
38

LESSIG, supra note 24, at 248-268.

39

Copyright Issues in Digital Media, Congressional Budget Office vii (Aug. 2004) (available at
<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf>).
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generally enforce copyright related issues. The focus is not on preserving creative content,
but rather protecting a product and revenue stream40. Further, the media industries are
having their livelihood threatened, not by the evils of digital media piracy, but rather
technology that allows simplified methods of artist cultivation, promotion, and finished
product distribution41.

The industry’s oligopoly is being challenged by new entrants

because the major entry barriers have been removed42. Further, much to the dismay of the
media industries, there has been a shift in the social norms that are driving the change.

C.

What’s Normal

The Dot-Com Era created a societal and cultural shift in the feeling toward and
treatment of Internet based goods. As companies went live with electronic businesses and
stepped away from traditional brick-and-mortar enterprises, corporate valuation was no
longer based on debt, revenue, and sales, but rather clicks and unique visits43; the more
visitors, the higher a company’s stock rose44. In an effort to get unique views and click
through users, the online enterprises established a unique pricing scheme to drive users to
their electronic stores. The bottom-line price was often free and in many cases when a
company attempted to charge for service, a competitor arose that undercut the pricing and

40

Music to Whose Ears? University of California-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law Conference on the
Debate over Digital Music 11 (April 6, 2000) (available at
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/events/roundtable99/background.pdf>).
41

Id.

42

Id. at 12.

43

Jerry Useem, Dot-coms What Have We Learned?, Fortune, Oct. 30, 2000, at 82.

44

Jack Wilson, eBusiness: The Hope, the Hype, the Power, the Pain, Univ. of Massachusetts (visited Nov. 3,
2004) <http://www.jackmwilson.com/eBusiness/eBusinessBook/Finances.htm>.
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competed by giving away the service45. The Dot-Com Era pricing structures created the
first push toward shifting the socially normal view of “access pricing” on the Internet,
which was only echoed with the advent of peer-to-peer file sharing systems46.
The rise of P2P file sharing technology and its widespread use only propagated the
social norm we see persisting today47. The media industries have used the litigation side
of their strategy to fight this social norm and attempt to return some order to media content
distribution48. What is being overlooked by the media distributors is that this social norm
is an intricate attitude that can be used to furnish new revenue streams. While some
believe that, “so many people… knowingly violating the law is culturally unhealthy,49”
these attitudes simply reflect the desire for a market shift and a realignment of social
norms. File sharing or digital content stealing cannot be classified as a “gateway” crime in
the same way marijuana is considered a gateway drug; just because someone downloads
the new Brittney Spears song this week does not me she will go rob a bank next week.
Further, the social norms we are experiencing now in regard to copyrighted material are
not much different from the past. Consumers do not pay for copyrighted material because
it is copyright, but rather they pay for a quality product.
Quality of produced works and related marketing leads to consumer demand, not
the fact that there is a legal right to the work. At one time, consumers dealt out hard

45

Useem, supra note 43, at 82.

46

LESSIG, supra note 24, at 125-126.

47

Id.

48

WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 243 (Stanford Press 2004).

49

Id.
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earned dollars for a product called a Pet Rock, no more than an average stone in a box50.
There were plenty of free rocks outside, but consumers were drawn to this product, which
resulted in revenue for the company producing the product. What can be learned from
this? People will pay for anything and a company can charge a premium for the right to
choose. You can have a dirty, unfriendly rock for free from the side of the road or a
pleasant, well trained rock in a box for a premium. Further, when a consumer decided to
pick-up a free rock from the side of the road, this did not mean he was stealing from the pet
rock industry. He was exercising his freedom of choice in a free market economy. While
the pet rock analogy is not a direct correlation to the media industries,51 the fact of the
matter is when a free market coexists with a pay market, there must be some differentiating
factor to drive consumers to pay for a product as opposed to taking it for free. From pet
rocks to virtual companies, businesses over time, and namely the recent Dot-Com Era,
taught us one other thing about access pricing, free is not a price that can exist in business
equilibrium; companies must make enough money to continue their operations.

IV.

Barriers Are Being Erected on all Fronts
While there is always the potential the media and content delivery companies will

realign their models to better reflect one of a distribution company, barriers are being
erected by lobby groups and Congress alike. Traditional media is acting in an effort to
preserve the oligopoly, litigate social norms, and contain their “old guard” operations.

50

Pet Rock, Super70s.com (visited Nov. 3, 2004)
<http://www.super70s.com/Super70s/Culture/Fads/Pet_Rocks.asp>.

51

There were countless unclaimed rocks in nature, when dealing with digital copies of copyrighted songs,
there are countless copies available as well, however the copyright holder lays claim to those as too.
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A.

Preserve and Protect

Congress has taken the opportunity to realign the laws regarding copyright
regulation and media distribution with guidance from major industry players.

This

guidance has resulted in regulations reflecting the need of the competitors and not
necessarily the consumers or creators.
Mr. Lessig diligently outlines how the music and movie industries have used their
power to influence Congress to extend copyright terms52. Lessig notes that, based on a net
present value (NPV) analysis of a company’s existing copyright, it is worth it for them to
spend up to that NPV on lobbying efforts53. There is a fatal flaw in this argument, though.
This assumes that every company that owns a copyright will be able to lobby for, and
succeed in, gaining a copyright extension based on their marginal contribution. It is a
popular belief that the media companies or copyright owners have unlimited power to
engage Congress to effect copyright extensions and manipulate the laws related to their
regulation. However, a company itself does not necessarily have the power, so from where
does this opinion arise? The answer is the power of collective bargaining.
In an oligopoly, non-associated companies may attempt to work together to form a
cartel54. When firms in a marketplace work together in collusive behavior to set prices, set
quantities, and divide up the market, they have established an illegal cartel55. Based on the
media producers collective work via their respective trade groups (the RIAA and MPAA),

52

LESSIG, supra note 24, at 217-218.

53

Id. at 216-217.

54

DUNCAN K. FOLEY, ECONOMIC REASONING 179 (2004)
<http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/GECO6190/>.

55

Id.
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the media industries have created what echoes of a cartel56. However these trade groups
have avoided being classified or prosecuted as a cartel by a legal distinction between
explicit and tacit collusion57. Explicit collusion is punishable by law:
so that the act of communication is of central importance. For economists,
however, this distinction has no meaning. In game theory models of
collusion, the term "agreement" does not imply a formal communication all that is needed is for the cartel members to have an "understanding" of
how others will react to their behavior. Such shared beliefs - whether
acquired tacitly or not - can support a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium58
This distinction has most likely lead to the lack of any form of antitrust action against the
media companies; however, the distinction is irrelevant for an economic analysis. Further,
the distinction also has not stopped media distributors from exerting their power to
influence Congressional and market decisions. The most recent example of this is in the
cable industry.
Consumer demand and technology accessibility has driven interest in what is aptly
known as “A-La-Carte Pricing” in the cable and satellite industry59.

In A-La-Carte

Pricing, cable subscribers are able to purchase and view only the channels in which they
are interested, as opposed to being forced to purchase an entire cable package of
channels60. Cable and satellite companies have been reluctant to adopt a model of this sort
claiming, “it would ultimately raise subscriber costs and harm diversity on the airwaves,”

56

Dan Krimm, Creating a Merit-Based Music Economy: Compulsory or Blanket Licensing for Interactive
Subscription Services, 19 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Hastings Law Journal).
57

Anthony Maul, Are the Major Labels Sandbagging Online Music? An Antitrust Analysis of Strategic
Licensing Practices, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 365, 390 (2003).
58

Id.

59

Frank Ahrens, FCC Asked To Examine A la Carte Cable TV, Wash. Post, May 20, 2004, at E04.

60

Id.
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since popular channels subsidize less popular channels creating a diversity of viewing
choices61. But how much more could cable rates rise? Cable prices have already risen
three times the rate of inflation since market deregulation in 199662. The cable companies
claim an astronomical jump in hardware and technology upgrades are necessary to achieve
A-La-Carte Pricing and the scheme would crush small and niche channels63. As we see in
the music and movie industries, the cable companies are misclassifying their industry’s
primary purpose.
It is not Comcast or Cox Communication’s responsibility to support fledgling
networks. Their job is to act as the means of delivery to end viewers. A-La-Carte Pricing
would not create an all or nothing situation where consumers are forced to choose only the
channels they want, but rather build in an additional option where consumers are permitted
to choose higher priced, single-channel options. Further, one of the cornerstones of the
cable industry’s argument is that smaller, niche channels would be squashed eliminating
the wide variety of choice exhibited in the current marketplace64. The flip side to this
argument is a lot of the small niche networks are actually in favor of A-La-Carte Pricing,
but do not have the collective power to push their views through to Congress or the FCC65.
Further, the Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America estimates place
the additional cost for A-La-Carte Pricing at an additional one to three dollars per month
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per subscriber66. But the push for A-La-Carte Pricing would substantially open the market
to competition, which the cable companies do not want to happen. So again consumer
demand is subdued, and the oligopoly is preserved for now.
Based on the cable argument, the music industry can argue that no individual songs
should be sold because it is necessary for the good music on a CD to be purchased in
conjunction with the less popular music to give consumers a greater diversity of options.
This argument is flawed from a strategic prospective; for consumers it eliminates choice
and for the music industry it eliminates the opportunity for additional revenue . It is a
blinding task to visualize how consumers are being taken out of the marketplace and these
oligopoly industries are given the freedom to grow and dominate, then complain to Uncle
Sam when consumers’ demand they have their power brought into check. So if you are in
the media industry and you feel your power slipping away, what do you do? Sue everyone
you can get your hands on.

B.

Damage Done

The media industry lawsuits and lobbying initially seemed to have some success at
redefining societal norms. However, the lawsuits have reached the point of diminishing
marginal returns. The media industry as a whole, including television, music, and movies,
made over $29.6 million in lobbying expenditures in 1998 and contributed an additional
$16.4 million to political campaigns67. Further, the RIAA itself spent $820,000 and
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$244,260 in lobbying expenditures and donations to political campaigns, respectively68.
Further, the RIAA has spent over $16.7 million on legal fees related to the prosecution of
piracy69. As a result of these efforts, the RIAA has managed to recover a whopping $9.5
million in lost profits70. Further, there are still 10.4 million households downloading music
and, “the average number of files downloaded per household grew between April and June
[of 2003], from 59 to 63.71” To add insult to injury, the most recent case to be tried against
large-scale distributors resulted in a crushing blow to the music industry72. In MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., the court held in favor of Grokster and stated that:
if a defendant could show that its product was capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses, then constructive knowledge
of the infringement could not be imputed. Rather, if substantial noninfringing use was shown, the copyright owner would be required to show
that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files73.
The reason this holding is damaging to the RIAA is the underlying rationale. Each file is
considered in the singular so there must be instantaneous recognition of its illegality. The
capstone for these issues is Napster, the first truly recognized and widely used peer-to-peer
system, which was appraised at $515 million at the time the music industry brought suit74.
67
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For that price, the music industry would have gained access to all the users, network, and
structure already in place75. Instead they embarked on a path having little if no effect on
adjusting social norms. And from a cost-benefit point of view, the music industry has
spent nearly as much fighting a battle as it would have cost to technologically improve the
industry. Finally, the industry fallout is not nearly as astronomical as prophesized by big
media when aggregate economic factors are observed.
While most of the onus is placed squarely on the shoulders of music downloading
as a source of the media industry’s financial woes76, there is one major economic factor
that must be considered. The U.S. has been in a recession, which was sparked by the burst
of the Dot-Com bubble77. As is typical in a recession, when people have insecurity about
their jobs and source of income, they decrease retail spending78. The media companies are
classified as retail goods and were bound to suffer some form of loss during a recession79.
Between 1999 and 2001, non-auto retail sales decreased almost 5% per year80, which
equates to approximately a 14.3% drop in consumer retail spending over the three year
period. When compared to the estimated 16% drop in consumer CD purchased proposed
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by the music industry81, the divergence in time of recession does not appear as detrimental
as the industry makes it out to be. There is a 1.7% difference, between the economic
depression and the music industry; however, this is well within a de minimus deviation for
an economic analysis.
So, we are in a recession, the media industries are screaming bloody murder as to
the societal treatment of their copyrights, but the foundation for their lost sales complaint is
arguably unfounded. Further, the tide of lawsuit and lobbying actions has returned weak
results. When push comes to shove, what is happening to those who are creating the
content that drives the media industries success? Are we inappropriately defining our
victims?

C.

Using Copyright Laws to Increase the Stranglehold

Artists, musicians and all those who add to the creative foundation of our society
are the ones who are suffering the byproducts of big media’s actions to manipulate their
respective industries to increase copyright protection. One of the foundations of creative
content in society is the ability to compose and conduct new works based on deriving one’s
own work from past artists. Mr. Lessig prophesizes the death of this derivative use based
on amplified statutory protection and increased copyright terms82. Lessig believes the
changing scope of copyright laws have lead to the unprecedented control over current
derivative uses83.

The question is how far away is this doomsday prophecy?

The
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additional limits on the future of creation protection are already in place and being locked
down.
Big media companies have worked to increase their hold on all creative markets by
increasing lobbying efforts. This concept is characterized in the increased restrictions
imposed under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)84, the No Electronic Theft
(NET) Act85 and Lessig’s hotly contested Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA)86. While much of this legislation is very recent, some of the potential effects on
creativity in the U.S. have been seen as a threat to the balance between the aggregate
creative content in society as well as a threat to the Constitutional framer’s vision of
copyright in of itself87. All this protection is in response to the media companies, not the
artists, response for help.

Therefore, the positively forecasted results for copyright

equilibrium presented are heavily contentious. While few outside the media industry
contend this is the best course of action, we are left to see the outcome in a future release.

V.

Structuring the Right to Buy
If social norms cannot be changed, they can be harnessed, but first they must be

understood. Further, the industry and its applicable models must be considered before they
can be implemented.
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A.

We Will Pay for Our Freedoms, Thank You

The big media industries have overlooked a very major point as they have
constructed their strategy; consumers will pay more for the freedom of choice. The new
Napster music service is a prime example of paying a premium for access, delivery
method, and format choice. On Napster, it costs users $9.95 a month for a subscription to
rent music tracks88. If users wish to burn music to a CD to listen to it in a conventional CD
player, they incur an additional $0.99 fee per song, all of which contains restricted use89.
For comparison purposes, in 2003, the average price of a CD was $15.0690 and the average
number of tracks on a rock CD was 1391. This means, the average cost per song on a rock
CD was $1.1692. While this price may appear to justify a $0.99 price per song on Napster,
consider the following information. With over three million paying users on Napster, in
order to get the same price as the average $1.16 per song on CD, based on the $9.95
monthly subscription fee, a user would have to download more than 62 songs per month93.
Based on the royalties paid to the music industry, there is no doubt they would be happy
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with these results. These astronomical numbers are not being reached on a monthly basis
and users are paying, on average, more per song in order to have the freedom to choose
single tracks94.

B.

Miss the Boat and You May Fall Off the Face of the Earth

A traditional method of conducting an external environmental analysis is known as
a SWOT analysis where a firm or industry dynamically examines the Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats based on a proposed action95. A firms strengths
are those resources and capabilities that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and
sustainable96.

In the case of the music industry, the copyrights themselves do not

necessarily fit the facet of being a sustainable competitive advantage, at least not in the
long run. While the copyrights are valuable and sustainable based on current federal
regulation, technology has reduced their ability to be imitated.
A strategic weakness in the industry is the ability to control social norms. While
the industry is convinced they can do so, as stated before, the legal approach is having
marginal returns at best97.

Further, the opportunities and threats come from an

environmental analysis of how a specified approach effects the corresponding
environments; namely the socio-cultural, economic, technological, and political/legal
environments98. For example, when the media industries chose to embark on a route of
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lobbying and lawsuits, it appeared to be a logical maneuver to attack those “stealing” from
the industry. However, the media industries failed to observe a dynamic analysis of the
corresponding environments.

Taking a critical approach to this, as the industries

manipulated the legal/political environment, society’s values and attitudes (social norms)
were already in a state of transition. Further, technology had advanced beyond what the
industries could control and their actions had little success at stopping the technological
dissemination99. Acting on miscalculations or misclassifications has crippled the media
industries on a grand scale. Similar results can be observed in other industries based on a
failure to properly apply a strategic analysis to their actions.
Misclassification of a company’s goal and directives will lead to a loss of revenue
and failure to grow and progress in the appropriate direction100. The misclassification and
failure to appropriately forecast the repercussions from an action can also result in an
unwanted regulatory scheme101. This has come to light in the current case of radio and
television regulation by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) which drove popculture radio icon Howard Stern from the free airwaves to satellite broadcasting102.
Many believe radio companies like Clear Channel have a stranglehold on the radio
market.

Companies of this stature have no incentive to influence the government’s

regulatory regime over their broadcast medium when there is no alternative. But, again,
this is a case of a company being blindsided by the advent and acceptance of technological
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advancements103. In the past few years, consumers have encountered a new means of
receiving radio broadcasts, satellite radio104. With this new medium, consumers, once
again, are given the opportunity to pay a premium for the freedom of choice105. Not only
are consumers opting to pay, but they are moving in masses to the new medium106. While
market forces in of themselves have sparked much of this move, one of the key factors is
the overregulation in traditional radio by the FCC107. This heightened level of fines and
regulation have pushed traditional radio advocates to leave the free airwaves and enter the
pay marketplace108. As a byproduct for the traditional radio broadcasters who have not
worked to properly influence FCC regulation, the result has been a loss of market share
and revenues109. While this is one example of an industry being hit by the failure to
properly assess their business position from a legal and regulatory standpoint, the failure to
analyze one’s business purpose can have similar results.
A strong example of improper business analysis can be observed in the case of
Eastman Kodak. Focusing on its ability to produce high end prints from photographic
film, Kodak, for years, regarded itself as a picture company110. However, Kodak was
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crippled by lost revenue with the advent of digital imaging111. As the price of digital
cameras dropped, more people were introduced to digital technology and fewer people
paid to expose traditional prints. Instead, people transitioned and began storing them in
digital form on their computers. It was not until Kodak reverted to a model of an imaging
company that they were able to recover market share112. By viewing themselves as an
imaging company and focusing on the images associated with any camera, digital or film,
Kodak appropriately moved to a structure focused on customer demand and an evolving
marketplace.

VI.

Don’t Look the Other Way, Act a Different Way
Traditional media is a dying industry. Traditional television, movie and music

companies need to continually work harder to maintain their present position113. Further,
tw
o primary indicators of a dying goliath are a consolidation or excess

industry mergers in

conjunction with extensive lobbying in Washington114. The media companies are pushing
both of these aspects at an exceptional rate115 and must consider a new approach in order to
survive.

The new model must strike a balance between fair use for innovation and

protection of copyrights. This requires a complete reassessment from the media industries.
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Copyright law should be seen as protecting public interest, not just individual creators116.
This view will permit the copyright framework to diverge from a monetary focus and
target influencing creativity117. Further, the adoption of the view that copyright law is
there purely to protect the copyright holder has lead to the oligopoly we currently have.
Competition is coming and media companies have the ability to grab a lion’s share
of the new markets by utilizing the first mover advantage in the future.

Inefficient

oligopoly structures cannot be maintained in a free market economy such as the U.S.
because competitors will move in to fill the void in niche markets and attempt to grow
using their specific competitive advantages118. Social norms indicate people pay for choice
and quality119 and legal barriers are just another hurdle, not a wall to consumer demand.

A.

The Basic Framework

The media companies need to look at themselves as logistics companies. Based on
an environmental analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the
media industry, the copyrights are no longer a strategic advantage however, the marketing
and distribution network the media companies have at their disposal can provide an
advantage. The media industries strengths are not the product, but rather your ability to get
product to market. The problem is not production. Technology has lowered these costs to
make them more accessible to all artists and media companies alike, but getting the

116

Jeremy Paul Sirota, Analog to Digital: Harnessing Peer Computing, 55 Hastings L.J. 759, 780-781 (Feb.
2004).
117

Id.

118

Interview with William Spaulding, Lecturer of Management, Wayne State University School of Business
Administration, in Detroit, MI (July 19, 2004).

119

See generally, Part V., Section A, titled We Will Pay for Our Freedoms, Thank You, of this paper.

27

product to the public is still difficult120. While anyone can develop an idea, song, movie
concept or show, marketing and distribution is the true barrier to which the media
industries can grant access. This competitive advantage must be utilized to survive.
The copyright holders will benefit from this shift. They will have the ability to hire
the best distribution company for their product, not necessarily those who have locked
them into long-term contracts and hold them captive. The media companies will resist this
aspect because they already have a captive artist base. However, a shift from the current,
vertically integrated market scheme is necessary to eliminate the history-dependant path in
the industries. While the old method was feasible, the competitive landscape has changed
and is no longer being optimized.
As a logistics company, there are numerous constituents to be served. There are
artists who need their product picked up and end users (consumers) who will receive the
product in multiple formats. Neither can be ignored because both are necessary for the
model to operate properly.

Further, efficiency and time-critical delivery are necessary

elements. Therefore, there must be a focus on technology advancements for security and
infrastructure. With this model, the option to have the traditional method coexist is not
dead, but the primary focus shifts to a more profitable method of operation. This is much
more related diversification than traditionally done in media, but will provide for a better
ability to refine and focus on true competitive advantages and core competencies. Further,
based on consumer desire to pay more for the right to choose between delivery methods,
the more novel the media industries can be, and the greater the premium they can charge
for their product.
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B.

Protecting the Creators

Consumers will pay for choice and quality and this norm must be optimized. This
is not to say those who create what society considers “good works” deserve more
protection than those creative pieces not considered as high quality. However, it is not
exclusively the job of the media industries to perpetually use lobbying power to extend
copyright law. The focus for protecting the copyright holders from the point of view of the
media companies needs to be in security protocols and systems integration. As exhibited
with the software industry, companies need to work within the bounds of the technology
available, not work against it121.

C.

Technology Strategies

Some advocates contend there is no reason to invest in new technologies and digital
distribution methods because they will simply become outdated and be cheaper to
implement in the future122. While this argument has some merit, the onus is on distribution
and security companies to address the financial issues inherent in their operations. Further,
there are multiple strategies involved in technology integration including a first mover
strategy, second mover strategy as well as a late adopter strategy, each with relative
advantages and disadvantage123. Based on the differences, one cannot argue that not
adopting or constantly taking a “wait-and-see” approach is always right simply because
technology will inevitably decrease in cost over time; that guarantees no change and
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promises death124.

The media industries have held to a history-dependent path as

exemplified by the repetition of legal and lobbying actions each time there is a new
technological jump125. While copying what the competition does will provide flexibility of
resources, some competitive aspects will be lost126. Certain companies, such as Sony
Corporation have made their niche with a first mover advantage by introducing and
perfecting technological advances before the relative competition127, while others such as
Hitachi have exercised a follower strategy in order to optimize the late adopters market128.
Empirical data shows different competitors within different industries reap benefits from
either the first or second mover strategies129. However, this same data also points a
company in the direction of a first mover strategy or a hybrid strategy when there is a need
to focus on technological advancements and research and development in order to
maximize returns130. The technology adoption strategy for content distribution within the
media industries needs to be considered based on the same grounds. A hybrid strategy
employed by in-house development to more effectively and efficiently deploy resources
will perpetuate a goal of meeting consumer demand as it evolves over time. In addition, it
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secures an evolutionary growth strategy for big media. This cannot be a static strategy, but
one continually providing more differentiation for consumer and creator alike.

D.

Structural and Supply Chain Integration

Media companies need to shift focus away from their current vertically integrated
structure. The media companies have a strategy of both forward and backward integration
to control the entire supply chain. Vertical integration is defined as the degree to which a
company owns its upstream and downstream supply chain131. This has resulted in multiple
inefficiencies based on a lack of competition from suppliers and higher overall operating
costs132. These costs have perpetually been pasted onto the consumer and made the end
product pass beyond the threshold of equilibrium price based on relative differentiation133.
Within the media industries, the largest example of the failure of the vertical integration
scheme is the merger of AOL and Time-Warner in 2000134. This merger was supposed to
add efficiencies and lower industry costs, but resulted in such a failure that over $160
billion in market value was destroyed based on the inability to optimize supply chain
synergies135. Further, when competition can easily be obliterated based on game theory
and collusion, there is no incentive for the oligopoly members to operate efficiently.136
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This has been perpetuated by vertical integration. Wall Street knows this based on AOLTime Warner; the consumers know this based on exercising alternative options; but the
media industries seem blind to the fact. The media industries must consider a process of
decentralizing operations to maximize competitive efficiencies. Again, this change will
not be welcomed because it threatens the oligopoly, but it is necessary to lower costs, meet
demand, and revive the industry.

E.

Disputes Will Arise

As in the software industry, when there is a focus on digital media distribution,
piracy is inevitable. Whether the piracy is willful or accidental, someone will find a way
not only to usurp the system and security, but distribute the result. This, in and of itself, is
not a reason to avoid entering a market or upgrading one’s distribution network. It is,
however, reason enough to consider how these claims will be handled.

The current

method has been a wide-scale legal assault on distributors and users in the courtroom with
marginal results at best137. Forcing a party to settle because they are unaware of their legal
rights or unable to afford adequate counsel138 does not solve the underlying problem of
protecting the copyright holders while educating the public139. The media industries need
to consider an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) model in order to streamline the
process for all parties.
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An ADR model will provide a number of unrealized benefits. In general, the
mediation process was instituted and expanded because it reduces many of the risks
associated with comparable litigation regarding both tangible and intangible costs140.
Tangible costs include the dollar value placed on litigation in court fees and legal fees;
intangible costs include those related to lost productivity and emotional strain on the
parties themselves141. Admittedly, there are relative risks in ADR including lower average
settlements142, but as the situation currently stands, the average consumer case settles for
approximately $3,000143. Further, the aggregate risks of ADR tend to be outweighed by
the benefits in a copyright suit144. If the media industries wish to hold true to their
principles such that legal action is necessary in order to protect the artists145, then an
alternative dispute method will better protect the parties involved146. Claims are settled in
a timely manner, the costs are lower for all parties, and judicial economy is maximized.

F.

Show Me the Money

The question should not be can this model make money, but rather how long can
the media distributors act as the old guard before the entire industry implodes. The signs
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are there, what can be classified as “old media” companies are falling into a perilous
situation. New competitors are setting up distribution channels that will allow copyrighted
artists to reach the masses with their work in a manner that will not require current
distribution channels147. Unfortunately, the media companies have allowed their size and
bureaucracy to place them in a position many other oligopoly industries have found
themselves, fighting for minute pieces of market share while relatively small competitors
begin to dominate the marketplace. As observed in the U.S. automotive industry, long
thought to be one of the strongest oligopolies, the lack of concentration on entering
competitors has resulted in foreign companies taking advantage of system efficiencies and
changes in governmental regulation148 to bring down the oligopoly149.

The software

industry presents another example of industry monoliths reconsidering their strategies and
producing a positive outcome.
There is no question that a select number of competitors dominate the software
industry. Companies like Microsoft, Oracle, Dell, and IBM to name a few150, command
their respective niche in the same manner companies like MGM, Sony, and Viacom
dominate in the media industries151. However, new entrants and technologies provide a
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constant threat to the software giants’ respective market share.

Most recently and

continually is the attack by open-source operating system Linux on Microsoft Windows152.
However, even with the assault from pirates and competitors alike, the software giants are
able to prevail through a multi-tiered approach including legal, legislative, and competitive
reassessment. None of these factors alone are enough to retain a lead in the industry,
however, in the aggregate, they are able to survive, grow, and thrive.

Not by

underestimating and neglecting the customer and the competitor, but rather working within
the respective bounds to achieve optimal results.

Conclusion
Neither technology nor pirates are the source of all evil. In this day and age, they
are two factors to be worked with and dealt with, but not disregarded. An industry cannot
ignore these external environmental factors when designing its strategy and a failure to
recognize this will result in a failure to grow. Sustained growth is not an accidental
endeavor; it must be planned for and executed in a systematic manner to achieve optimal
results153.
In recent years, technology advancements and the accessibility to means of
information reception have greatly reduced the cost to consumers and digital media content
providers. However, along with these advancements have been a number of byproducts
associated with the territory. These factors include the need for enhanced security, a
152
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reevaluation of the current operating environment, and a reassessment of consumer
demand for media in multiple formats.
The media industries have become apathetic over the years. The major threat to
their existence is not piracy or peer-to-peer file sharing, but rather the reduced barriers to
entry resulting in new competitors, threatening the very existence of the oligopoly or cartel
the media companies have worked so hard to build up and barricade from the rest of
business. No oligopoly likes being threatened, however if the collusion continues, the
competition will find breaks in the dam to exploit. The fact of the matter is the old media
model is representative of a dying industry gasping for air as it clings to market share and
overregulation. However, this is only prolonging the death.
The media companies have lost focus. They push for stiffer copyright laws, longer
periods of enforcement, and additional statutory coverage, but this strategy is not helping
to expand the aggregate creative content in society. The artists, the parties who truly
deserve the copyrights are being left out of the equation. The media industries are not
gaining the results the artists deserve through their legal assault on pirates alone.
Technology has not been the only change; social norms have evolved since the
Dot-Com Era. For better or worse, consumers care less about the legal implications of
their actions and more about the quality of the product they are buying. A failure to
recognize the benefit of consumers’ desire to pay for their freedom of choice is a failure to
recognize a market niche that can easily be exploited and has been exploited by companies
such as Napster and Apple.
The continued governmental lobbying to eliminate any inkling of a revolt amongst
consumers must be curtailed. The media industries are failing to look at the long-term
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implications of their increased regulation. They will drive consumers to new media; this is
best exemplified by the FCC
’s

recent overregulation driving radio personalities and

consumers to pay for satellite radio.
If the media companies are truly interested in cultivating and helping artists, they
need to start acting like it; rhetoric will only get a company so far. The media industries
have seen other industries like software fight through their battle with digital distribution,
which has resulted in decreased piracy. The media industries must make a dynamic,
strategic reevaluation of their respective industries and focus on their true strengths,
namely their distribution and marketing machines. Further, they need to reassess their
supply chain management and vertical integration plans to create as much efficiency in the
system as possible. This will reduce product price and decrease time to market while
capitalizing on social norms.
Finally, the media industries need to reconsider their legal approach. Piracy will
always exist and while lawsuits may be optimal for large scale distributors, they do little to
equitably resolve individual disputes. They also do not fulfill the media industries desire
to “educate” the public that piracy is bad. An alternative dispute resolution process will
not only streamline claims, they have the potential to maximize the return on investment
into an ADR system.
No one ever said managing an industry was easy. The external economic factors
that exist in business have come down in a crushing manner around the media companies.
By reevaluating their operating structure and consumer demand the media distributors can
come out on top and continue to perpetuate; it has been done before. Continuing to drive
in the current direction will not lead to any form of Fountain of Youth for preservation, but
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rather result in the same fate as the Fountain’s other seekers, nothing more than an
untimely demise.
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Appendix A – DVD Growth 1998-2003154
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Sell-Through DVDs
(In Millions of Units)
32.7
91.3
174.4
350.0
650.6
985.3

Percent Change from
Prior Year
--35.82%
52.35%
49.83%
53.80%
66.03%
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U.S. Entertainment Industry: 2003 MPA Market Statistics, Motion Picture Association Worldwide Market
Research, at 30 (2003).
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Appendix B – A-La-Carte Pricing in a Mixed Bundle Environment155
Network
Type

General
News
Older
Younger
E. Niche
E. Mass

Subscribers
Bundled

Mixed
bundled

(000,000)

(000,000)

87
86
80
84
34
64

70
60
52
63
20
38

Bundled
Revenue
per
month

$0.67
$0.20
$0.18
$0.25
$0.09
$0.08

Ad
revenue
per
month

$0.48
$0.20
$0.12
$0.24
$0.06
$0.09

Monthly A-La-Carte fee needed to
replace lost network revenue
Subscriber Ad
Marketing Total

$1.12
$0.50
$0.60
$0.50
$0.45
$0.40

$0.11
$0.10
$0.09
$0.08
$0.07
$0.12

$0.38
$0.16
$0.20
$0.20
$0.15
$0.17

$1.61
$0.76
$0.89
$0.78
$0.67
$0.69

Subscriber
price

(with cable
mark-up)
$2.72
$1.28
$1.50
$1.32
$1.13
$1.16

Definitions:
- General – mainstream networks such as ESPN, Lifetime, USA and Nickelodeon
- News – news networks such as ABC, CNN, and Fox News
- Older – older trending networks such as A&E and Bravo
- Younger – younger trending networks such as Disney, Comedy Central and MTV
- E. Niche – emerging niche networks such as Oxygen, BET Jazz, and Soapnet
- E. Mass – emerging mass market networks such as The Family Channel, SciFi and
Court TV
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